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FAILURE IS NOT AN OPTION: AN ESSAY ON WHAT
LEGAL EDUCATORS CAN LEARN FROM NASA'S





T HE APOLLO 13 MISSION took place in April 1970, longbefore most of our students were even a gleam in their par-
ents' eyes.2 While the Apollo 13 spacecraft was intended to land
on the moon, an explosion in an oxygen tank led to the failure
of multiple systems aboard, placing the astronauts in peril and
leading to the second-most famous quote of the early space era:
"Houston, we've had a problem here."
* Associate Professor of Law, the Earle Mack School of Law at Drexel
University. J.D., cum laude, Harvard Law School; M.P.H., University of Michigan;
A.B., Dartmouth College. Professor McElroy would like to thank Michael B.
McElroy, Brandi Casey, and Zoe McElroy for their insights into all that inspires
and motivates space exploration, as well as Michael Barton of the Drexel Legal
Research Center for his valuable assistance with the underlying research.
** Professor of Legal Practice, Director of Legal Analysis, Writing, and
Research, Wake Forest University School of Law. J.D., Wake Forest Law School
and Wake Forest University Center for Bioethics, Health, and Society; B.S.B.A.,
Bowling Green State University. This article is dedicated to Linda Nero for her
kindness and her enthusiasm for NASA, and to Dean Suzanne Reynolds and
Professors Margaret Taylor and Wilson Parker for their support and consistent
hope and optimism.
I Many of the ideas in this article were inspired by Professor McElroy's
experiences at Parent-Child Space Camp at the Space and Rocket Center in
Huntsville, Alabama, during the summer of 2009. A few paragraphs in this article
were originally published on page 16 of the Legal Writing Institute's August 2005
edition of its bulletin, The Second Draft, and are reprinted with permission.
2 See Jim Dumoulin, NASA Apollo Mission Apollo-13, KENNEDY SPACE CENTER,
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/history/apollo/apollo-13/apollo-13.html (last up-
dated June 29, 2001).
3 Id. Neil Armstrong's, "That's one small step for a man, one giant leap for
mankind," upon touching down on the moon on July 20, 1969, would probably
qualify as the most well-known quote (although there remains controversy about
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Yes, a problem. A big one. One for which the aeronautic en-
gineers at NASA were not prepared, despite all their theoretical
planning and thinking and training before the mission ever be-
gan.' And it was a real problem that arose during the Apollo 13
mission, not a theoretical one at all. Like lawyers representing
real clients, the aerospace professionals at Mission Control had
to think creatively to save the brave men who were, quite liter-
ally, lost in space, 200,000 miles from Earth.' Because the astro-
nauts knew how to fly an aircraft but not how to fix one, they
were totally dependent on the Houston ground crew to get
them home safely.
But the success that NASA experienced in solving these
problems was due, in large part, to many years of preparation.
The ground crew had worked as a team conducting multiple
simulations to prepare for systems failures, and while this partic-
ular type of failure was unanticipated, in the end, they were able
to use their vast preparation to achieve a positive result.6 What's
more, even as they were lost in space with little oxygen and even
less computer power, the astronauts knew that Gene Kranz,
Flight Director on the ground, was leading a team of intelligent,
dedicated scientists who would work together to get them
home.' And, on April 17, 1970, that's exactly what happened.8
whether he said "a man" or merely "man"). See One Small Step, APOLLO 11 LUNAR
SURFACE JOURNAL, http://history.nasa.gov/alsj/all/all.step.html (last revised
Feb. 16, 2010).
At the time of the mission, the world heard Neil say "That's one
small step for man; one giant leap for mankind." . . . [A]fter the
mission, Neil said that he had intended to say 'one small step for a
man' and believed that he had done so. However, he also agreed
that the 'a' didn't seem to be audible in the recordings. The im-
portant point is that the world had no problem understanding his
meaning. However, over the decades, people interested in details
of the mission . . . have listened repeatedly to the recordings, with-
out hearing any convincing evidence of the 'a'. In 2006, with a
great deal of attendant media attention, journalist / entrepreneur
Peter Shann Ford claimed to have located the 'a' in the waveform
of Neil's transmission. Subsequently, more rigorous analyses of the
transmission were undertaken by people with professional experi-
ence with audio waveforms and, most importantly, audio spectro-
grams. None of these analyses support Ford's conclusion.
Id.
4 See generally Charles Redmond, The Flight of Apollo 13, NASA, http://his-
tory.nasa.gov/apollo/apol3hist.html (last updated Oct. 22, 2004).
5 See Dumoulin, supra note 2.
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The story of the Apollo 13 mission is just one of the many
inspirational stories from the space program. It was an age of
exploration, of pushing boundaries, of discovering new ways of
doing things, often outside of our comfort zone. As 2010 marks
the anniversary of the Apollo 13 mission, we seek to honor
NASA's success during that mission by examining three of
NASA's signature training practices-simulation, teamwork, and
optimism-and discussing how those practices could be used ef-
fectively in legal education to prepare students for the realities
of practice.
Just as the Apollo 13 astronauts were a part of an age of explo-
ration-exploration beyond the Earth, that is-today's legal ed-
ucators live and work in an age of exploration all our own.
Many of us are influenced by the American Bar Association Task
Force on Law Schools and the Profession (the MacCrate re-
port),9 the report of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advance-
ment of Teaching (the Carnegie report),o and the report on
the Best Practices for Legal Education (Best Practices report),"
which posit that the professions can and should again borrow
effective educational practices from each other to improve stu-
dents' learning, analytical synthesis, and professional outcomes.
We also recognize that, like the individuals who work at Mission
Control, lawyers hold clients' lives and livelihoods in their
hands. Finally, we note that while law school teaches students to
think theoretically-much as scientists do when contemplating
a new mission-upon graduation law practice is anything but
theoretical.
Significantly, collaboration, simulation, and optimism are crit-
ical whether training for space exploration or client representa-
tion. According to the landmark Best Practices report, "law
schools [should] follow the lead of other professional schools
and transform their programs of instruction so that the entire
educational experience is focused on providing opportunities to
practice solving problems under supervision in an academic en-
9 ROBERT MAcCRATE, ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL
CONTINuUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION:
NARROWING THE GAP (1992).
10 wILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PRO-
FESSION OF LAW (2007).
11 Roy STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A
ROAD MAP (2007).
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vironment. This is the most effective and efficient way to de-
velop professional competence.""
Using the space program as an example, then, we examine
how simulation, collaboration/teamwork, and hope and opti-
mism can lead to more effective student outcomes by helping
law students achieve a deeper analytical level, bridging the gap
between theory and practice, and learning, retaining, and trans-
ferring knowledge gained in the law school classroom to the
practice of law.
II. PREPARATION BY SIMULATION
[Y]ou've got to expect .. . things are going to go wrong, and we always
need to prepare ourselves for handling the unexpected. And you just hope
those unexpected things aren't something that you can't cope with.
So throughout Apollo, everybody I knew was always saying, "What i "
and, "Is it possible that this could happen?" And, "What will we do?"
just that process of continually questioning built your confidence in your
ability to handle whatever comes along. 1 3
That individuals learn through experience is a basic tenet of
educational learning theory.14 Indeed, from the earliest days of
the space program, before Apollo 11 reached the moon, simula-
tion was a critical component of astronaut training." According
12 Id. at 106; see also id. at 125 ("All forms of experiential education involve
problem-based learning, so one of the strengths of experiential education is that
it gives students opportunities to practice solving problems and to receive feed-
back on the quality of their efforts.").
13 Neil A. Armstrong, Oral History Transcript, NASA JOHNSON SPACE CENTER
ORAL HISTORY PROJECT, 105 (Sept. 19, 2001), available at http://wwwjsc.nasa.
gov/history/oral_histories//ArmstrongNA/ArmstrongNA_9-19-Ol.pdf.
14 See generally DAVID A. KOLB, EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING: EXPERIENCE AS THE
SOURCE OF LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT (1984) (noting that reflection upon ex-
perience is critical to the learning process); see also SylviaJ. Hysong et al., A Review
of Training Methods and Instructional Techniques: Implications for Behavioral Skills
Training in U.S. Astronauts, NASA 9 (2007), http://stonjsc.nasa.gov/collections/
TRS/_techrep/TP-2007-213726.pdf ("[B]ecause of their fidelity, intensity, and
opportunity for customized learning, simulations are a highly effective training
method.").
15 See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 13.
We . . . spent a lot of time in simulations. . . . [W]e did a lot of
simulations of flight characteristics and aircraft trajectories and
things of that sort.
... I spent a lot of time evaluating the authenticity and appropri-
ateness of the simulation models that they were using. You'd usu-
ally find that the simulator didn't behave properly like it should in
some regions of life, so it was incumbent on us to uncover the
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to Astronaut Wendy Lawrence, a veteran of four space flights
who has logged over 1,225 hours in space,
One of the reasons why we take so long working through the
training programs is so that we are very familiar with our proce-
dures, so that we are not afraid of the unknown. It's easy to be
afraid of the unknown, but we train to the point where every-
thing is very well-known."
Simulation training was critical to the success of the Apollo 13
mission. When Apollo 13 began experiencing issues with its
power supply,17 Astronaut Ken Mattingly (who was scrubbed
from the mission because he had been exposed to measles")
and other technicians drew on lessons learned in simulations
problems that simulation had and try to make it as accurate as we
could.
... [I]t was an important part of our function....
Id. at 43-44.
We had a docking simulator which was quite, quite [realistic]. We
felt it was a good representation of what we could expect, and in-
deed it turned out to be quite similar to what we encountered in
flight.
I really believed that we wouldn't have any trouble with the dock-
ing, based on the simulations we did. Indeed, that turned out to be
the truth.
Id. at 53 (alteration in original). " [I]n-flight simulation was our thing out at Ed-
wards. We did lots of in-flight simulations, tried to duplicate other vehicles or
duplicate trajectories or duplicate this or duplicate that, make something fly like
something else." Id. at 68; see also Fred W. Haise,Jr., Oral History Transcript, NASA
JOHNSON SPACE CENTER ORAL HisTORY PROJECT, 12-20 (Mar. 23, 1999), available at
http://wwwjsc.nasa.gov/history/oral-histories/HaiseFW/FWH_3-2-99.pdf.
Each SIM [simulation] we conducted, no matter how short-be it a
launch SIM [simulation] which didn't run that long-we would
stop and evaluate what had happened, what had been done. And
as you said, it often may [have] changed the mission plan, but it-
and probably in more cases, it affected our procedures: How we
changed the malfunction procedures or our checklist. Those sorts
of things. Because we didn't leave anything unanswered. If it
couldn't be answered in real time following that mission-that sim-
ulation debrief, it would be carried over and worked off line.
Id. (alteration in original).
16 Telephone Interview by Lisa McElroy with Wendy Lawrence, Visiting Astro-
naut, Kennedy Space Center, in Kennedy Space Center, Florida (Dec. 11, 2009).
17 It has been said that "[t]he Apollo computers had less processing power
than a cell phone" has today. Craig Nelson, Ten Things You Didn't Know About the
Apollo 11 Moon Landing, PoiSci (July 13, 2009, 12:09 PM), http://
www.popsci.com/military-aviation-amp-space/article/2009-06/40-years-later-ten-
things-you-didnt-know-about-apollo-ii-moon-landing.
18 He never actually got measles, however. Science: Apollo's Crew: A Case in Con-
trasts, TIME (Apr. 17, 1972), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,944480,00.html.
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they had done in preparation for the mission to figure out how
to power down non-essential systems in order to keep the essen-
tial ones-and the astronauts-alive.19
To some extent, law schools already utilize simulation train-
ing. Clinical education, legal writing programs, and externships
traditionally have been the leading sources of experiential edu-
cation within the law school curriculum.2 0  As we and other
scholars have written previously, however, more can and should
be done through simulation and other active learning exercises
to provide students a more realistic experience throughout the
law school experience, just as NASA guarantees that astronauts
work through simulation exercises in a variety of contexts. To-
ward that end, law schools around the country are considering
and undergoing curricular reform consistent with the recom-
mendations in the Best Practices and Carnegie reports and de-
veloping further context-based, experiential casebook courses. 22
These courses use a variety of simulation exercises to "com-
19 Thomas K Mattingly II, Oral History Transcript, NASA JOHNSON SPACE
CENTER ORAL HISTORY PROJECT, 53 (Nov. 6, 2001), available at http://
wwwjsc.nasa.gov/history/oral-histories/MattinglyTK/MattinglyTK1 1-6-01.pdf.
20 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking Legal Education, 48 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 595 (2008) (lauding the merits of such curricular methods of
instruction).
21 See Christine Coughlin, Lisa McElroy & Sandy Patrick, See One, Do One, Teach
One: Dissecting the Use of Medical Education's Signature Pedagogy in the Law School
Curriculum, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 361 (2010); see also Steven A. Childress, The Baby
and the Bathwater: Salvaging a Positive Socratic Method, 7 OvA. CrrY U. L. REV. 333
(1982) (advocating a more pure form of the Socratic method); Benjamin V.
Madison, III, The Elephant in Law School Classrooms: Overuse of the Socratic Method as
an Obstacle to Teaching Modern Law Students, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 293, 320-23
(2008) (emphasizing the need for greater diversity of teaching methods); James
E. Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential Education, and Professional Responsibility,
38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 71, 83-34 (1996) (describing experiential education re-
form at Harvard); Deborah L. Rhode, Kicking the Socratic Method and Other Reforms
of Law Schools, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 26, 2001, at B15 (highlighting inad-
equacies in traditional legal education teaching methods); Ruta K. Stropus, Mend
It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of Traditional Law School Methodology in the 21st
Century, 27 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 449 (1996) (exploring the virtues of the Langdellian
method and arguing for its adaptation rather than demise); Susan Sturm & Lani
Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal Education in a Culture of Competition
and Conformity, 60 VAND. L. REV. 515, 533 (2007) (contrasting case method appli-
cations by law, medical, and business schools).
22 According to the 2008 survey conducted by the Association of Legal Writing
Directors, in response to the Best Practices and Carnegie reports, twenty-eight
schools had already undergone curricular reform and an additional eighty
schools were exploring the possibilities of it. See Association of Legal Writing
Directors, 2008 Survey Results, LEGAL WRITING INSTITUTE, at ix (2008), http://
alwd.org/surveys/survey-results/2008_SurveyResults.pdf.
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bin [e] academic inquiry with actual experience"2 to teach stu-
dents how real lawyers employ legal analysis in the
representation of clients:
Other professional fields provide some well-tested instances of
pedagogies that teach complex practical reasoning and judg-
ment, blending the cognitive and practical apprenticeships ....
In such simulations, performance can be rehearsed, criticized,
and improved "off-line." This removal from the exigencies of ac-
tual practice permits the instructors to focus on particular as-
pects of the complex ensemble of skills they are trying to teach.
The elements and sequence of skills can then be modeled and
rehearsed in safety-without real-world consequences or imme-
diate responsibility for the welfare of others. This kind of teach-
ing makes it more likely that students will reach a basic level of
competent practice from which expertise can be subsequently
developed."
The benefits of moving from the traditional passivity of the
Socratic dialogue to adding experience to doctrinal courses via
simulation exercises are myriad." As one legal scholar has
noted, "There is general agreement that simulation-based
courses can be an important site for developing the professional
skills and understandings essential for practice, including self-
directed learning skills." 2 6 In fact, "[t]here is no more effective
way to help students understand what it is like to be a lawyer
than to have them ... perform the tasks that lawyers perform or
observe practicing lawyers at work."2 ' The same is true when
training astronauts. NASA notes in a review of its training
manuals that learners absorb more through simulation because
the method "allow[s] the learner to rehearse the material
learned," leading to quicker learning and better retention of key
skills." NASA scientists have even posited that simulation exer-
23 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 121.
24 Id. at 133 (citing WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAwYERs 112-13
(July 2006 draft)).
25 In fact, this hypothesis has been tested empirically. See Stefan H. Krieger,
The Effect of Clinical Education on Law Student Reasoning: An Empirical Study, 35 Wm.
MITCHELL L. REv. 359, 362-63, 393-94 (2008) (concluding that students who
participated in experiential education activities in law school were better able to
identify some relevant facts in a legal fact pattern, identify legal rules relevant to a
client's problem, identify client interests, and consider next steps in a client
representation).
26 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 133.
27 Id. at 125.
28 Hysong et al., supra note 14, at 7.
2010] 509
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
cises teach astronauts better judgment and decision-making
skills,2 9 which are critical for both lawyers and astronauts alike.
However, while implementing the recommendations set forth
in Best Practices report and imitating NASA simulation training
methods may sound simple, in reality initiating effective simula-
tions realistically is a fairly complex task. As one scholar has
commented:
[I]n order to create a teaching simulation in law, the legal educa-
tor must build a dynamic model of a portion of the legal process by
abstracting, simplifying, and substituting parts of the actual legal sys-
tem so that the model presents the underlying theories to the
learner in a clearer fashion than would another teaching
model.so
In fact, most simulation courses in the United States, at least
in the way they are currently developed, do not produce "suffi-
ciently proficient graduates," because students are only provided
one opportunity to perform the skill and get limited feedback.3 '
Perhaps it is here, in the limitations of implementing simula-
tion, that we see the stark contrast with NASA's commitment to
simulating the tasks that astronauts must accomplish when
launched into space.
Indeed, implementing meaningful simulation exercises re-
quires intentionality, time, and resources. The professor must
clearly explain the appropriate structure to expose students not
only to theory and skill (or, in the case of space exploration,
science and execution), but also to the relationship between the
two, allowing them to synthesize the two lawyering compo-
nents.3 2 As one scholar noted, in order for simulations to work,
we must "deliberately design our simulations and feedback
mechanisms to help achieve the desired educational goals."33
Similarly, NASA has noted, "Because simulators are highly con-
trolled by the trainer/developer, they provide the opportunity
to effectively use learning principles such as appropriate feed-
back, distributed practice, and maximized training transfer."3 4
- Id. at 14-15.
30 STucKEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 136 (quoting Joseph D. Harbaugh, Simula-
tion and Gaming: A Teaching/Learning Strategy for Clinical Legal Education, in AALS/
ABA GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 195-96 (1980)).
31 Id. at 133-34.
32 Moliterno, supra note 21, at 81.
33 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 135.
3 Hysong et al., supra note 14, at 9.
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NASA emphasizes that feedback is critical to the simulation
learning process."
Therefore, to thoughtfully create meaningful, effective simu-
lation exercises that do in fact enhance students' ability to solve
problems, law professors should learn from NASA in consider-
ing the following:
1. The simulation exercises should be appropriately realistic
and complex for the students, and the purpose (s) and in-
struction for the exercise should be clear. 6
2. Simulation exercises should be based on articulated theo-
ries of practice."
3. Students should receive meaningful feedback and be de-
briefed following the exercise and allowed to evaluate the
simulation.
4. Students should be provided more than one opportunity
for a simulation and have multiple contexts within which
to conduct the simulation exercise."
5. The school should have "sufficient facilities, equipment,
and staffing to achieve the educational goals of its simula-
tion-based courses."40
Simulating client representation cannot avert every problem
that could arise in the courtroom or boardroom, any more than
simulation could have saved the astronauts in the Apollo 1,41
See id. at 11 (noting that feedback leads to quicker learning and better reten-
tion, but also noting limitations such as class size and cost).
3 STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 137. "[M]any students report that they are
asked to [perform simulation exercises] in a vacuum-in other words, they are
expected to simulate the work of an attorney without any informed idea of what
that work would look like." Coughlin et al., supra note 21, at 41. "Legal educa-
tion theorists note that, without detailed and individualized feedback, attempts at
simulation and experiential learning in the law school classroom may fall flat
because students have no way of assessing their successes and no guideposts for
improving upon their work." Id. at 40. "Students therefore lack confidence in
their abilities to parlay their analytical abilities into producing a complaint," en-
gaging in a negotiation, or counseling a client. Id. at 42.
3 See STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 136-37 ("Fidelity of the simulation to
the real world analog is a critical aspect of design, because it fosters transference
of learning from the exercise to the real world and motivates students to engage
in the exercise and to suspend disbelief.").
3 Id. at 137-38.
3 See Coughlin et al., supra note 21, at 19.
40 STucKEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 138.
41 Apollo 1 caught on fire on the launch pad on January 27, 1967, killing the
three astronauts aboard who could not unlatch the capsule's two hatches in time
to escape. See Apollo Mission Apollo 1, NASA, http://history.nasa.gov/Apollo204/
(last updated Jan. 27, 2010).
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Columbia,4 2 or Challenger4" missions. But Apollo 13 gives us
context for considering how simulation can prepare students for
many types of problems and issues that arise in a professional
context, particularly one that requires quick but intelligent re-
sponses. Were students to practice key lawyering skills-like in-
terviewing, counseling, negotiation, decision-making, and
problem-solving-in realistic simulations regularly scheduled
throughout law school, they, like the members of the Apollo 13
team, might be better prepared to "bring their astronauts
home."
III. PREPARATION BY COLLABORATION OR TEAMWORK
When thinking about the problem facing NASA on April 13,
1970, during the Apollo 13 mission crisis, law students can draw
the analogy for themselves: the astronauts (the "clients") were
relying completely on the expertise of the ground crew (the
people in the advisory, "attorney" role).4" The analogy is only
complete, however, when we consider how the ground crew at
Mission Control went about solving the problem. The only way
for the astronauts to make it back to Earth was to move into
another part of the spacecraft, the lunar module.4 5 The ground
42 The space shuttle Columbia blew up on February 1, 2003, when reentering
Earth's atmosphere. The explosion occurred because a piece of foam insulation
broke off during launch, damaging the shuttle's thermal protection system. All
seven astronauts aboard died. See Remembering Columbia STS-107 Introduction,
NASA, http://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Introduction.html (last updated Sept.
17, 2009).
43 The space shuttle Challenger broke apart seventy-three seconds after launch
on January 28, 1986, because of a leak in a rocket booster that ignited the shut-
tle's fuel tank. All seven astronauts aboard, including teacher Christa McAuliffe,
died. See The Crew of the Challenger Shuttle Mission in 1986, NASA, http://
history.nasa.gov/Biographies/challenger.html (last updated Sept. 17, 2009).
44 For a far less dramatic, but still instructive, example of how the ground crew
had to "lawyer" from the ground, see an account of the real Apollo 13 "problem":
Another major event . . . threw a usually cool and calm astronaut
into a mild panic. . . . [An Apollo 13 astronaut] forgot to file his
[f]ederal [i]ncome [t]ax return [and realized it after he was al-
ready in space]. "How do I apply for an extension?" he asked.
Amid laughter from Mission Control, he sought to explain: "Things
kinda happened real fast down there and I need an extension. I'm
really serious. Would you . . . turn it in?" Later, Flight Director
Glynn Lunney said that American citizens out of the country get a
60-day extension on filing. "I assume this applies," he added.
Jerry Woodfill, Apollo 13 "Houston, We've Got a Problem.", NASA, Page 6, http://
erjsc.nasa.gov/SEH/pg6.htm (last modified Apr. 30, 2002).
4 See Dumoulin, supra note 2 (referring to the lunar module as the "LM
lifeboat").
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crew had to use teamwork to figure out, under time pressure,
how to make square carbon dioxide scrubbers on the command
module side fit into the round air filter on the lunar module
side, using only items on board the spacecraft.4 6 In the words of
the flight director in charge of the Apollo 13 mission in the
1995 film based on the event, "I suggest you gentlemen invent a
way to put a square peg into a round hole. Rapidly."
And the engineers responded, dumping everything available
on the craft onto a conference room table.48  "Okay, people.
Listen up. The people upstairs handed us this one, and we gotta
come through. We gotta find a way to make this [holding up
the square cartridge] fit into the hole for this [holding up a
round one] usin' nothin' but that [pouring out the usable
materials]. Let's get it organized . . . Better get some coffee
goin', too, someone."4
And they figured it out, using the cover from a flight plan,
some duct tape, and some socks."o They saved the astronauts."
46 See id. (detailing the problem of carbon dioxide removal).
4 APOLLO 13 (Universal Pictures 1995).
48 Id. (referencing actions taken from the movie),
- Id.
5o Id. Here is Jim Lovell's description of what occurred:
What happened was, in the lunar module, which we didn't think
about at the time but some of the people in [Manned Spacecraft
Center] Crew Systems [Division] did, that the round canisters were
devised and developed to support 2 people for 2 days and that they
were round and that they were lithium-hydroxide that would re-
move the carbon dioxide. Now they were becoming saturated.
And the partial pressure of carbon dioxide was rising-something
that we didn't really notice at first. But the ground started to notice
it and they started to try to figure out what they could do. Now in
the dead command module, they use in their environmental system
square canisters. Had plenty of them, but you can't put a square
canister in the round hole of the lunar module system. Big engi-
neering goof. Why we had square there, we had round over there,
we'll never know. So, what the Crew Systems came up with was how
to jerry-rig a square canister to work in the lunar module. We did it
with tape, plastic, cardboard, and a little sock. And, by gosh, it
worked!
James A. Lovell, Jr., Oral History Transcript, NASA JOHNSON SPACE CENTER ORAL
HISTORY PROJECT, 12-51 (May 25, 1999), available at http://wwwjsc.nasa.gov/his-
tory/oral histories/LovellJA/JAL_5-25-99.pdf.
51 APOLLO 13, supra note 47. As Lovell explained it:
Well, they-first of all they started up, you know, I-we sent down
everything we could when we had the explosion. They said that
we-this was after we saw the oxygen. They said, "Yeah, we got a lot
of guys working on it down here. We'll help you out." I said,
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As we saw from the Apollo 13 success, teamwork is what it's all
about. 5 2 The same was certainly true for other, earlier mis-
sions, both for the astronaut teams and the ground crews.5 4
"Thanks a lot!" But they-I have to tell you, that's when they
started getting that teamwork together.
Lovell, supra note 50, at 12-47.
52 Lovell noted:
And essentially Jack [Swigert] and I started to build this thing. And
we-just according to the instructions-the instructions were ex-
plicit and it was a great job. And, if you look at the one that the
Crew Systems had made to show the people in the Control Center
and you look at the one that's hanging on the lunar module wall,
they're identical.
Id. at 12-52.
53 According to astronaut Neil Armstrong:
We were a very close team. We spent almost all our time together
for months on end, getting ready for [the Gemini V mission], . . .
going back and forth between Houston . . . , working with the
spacecraft as it was nearing completion, and participating in the
testing of that spacecraft. . . . We would spend enormous amounts
of time together, working out the details.
Armstrong, supra note 13, at 47-48. Addressing Congress, astronaut Buzz Aldrin
explained:
[T]he footprints at Tranquility base belong to more than the crew
of Apollo 11. They were put there by hundreds of thousands of
people across this country, people in government, industry and uni-
versities, the teams and crews that preceded us, all who strived
throughout the years with Mercury, Gemini and Apollo.
Transcript of Astronauts'Address to Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1969, at 30 (quot-
ing Edwin E. "Buzz" Aldrin, Jr.).
54 As Armstrong explained it:
I was certainly aware that this was a culmination of the work of
300,000 or 400,000 people over a decade and that the nation's
hopes and outward appearance largely rested on how the results
came out. With those pressures, it seemed the most important
thing to do was focus on our job as best we were able to and try to
allow nothing to distract us from doing the very best job we could.
And, you know, I have no complaints about the way my colleagues
were able to step up to that.
I can only attribute [the low component failure rate per flight] to
the fact that every guy in the project, every guy at the bench build-
ing something, every assembler, every inspector, every guy that's
setting up the tests, cranking the torque wrench, and so on, is say-
ing, man or woman, "If anything goes wrong here, it's not going to
be my fault, because my part is going to be better than I have to
make it." And when you have hundreds of thousands of people all
doing their job a little better than they have to, you get an improve-
ment in performance. And that's the only reason we could have
pulled this whole thing off.
Armstrong, supra note 13, at 78-79.
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Because effective teamwork is critical to the success of any mis-
sion, astronaut training includes an emphasis on this all-impor-
tant skill. 5 As Astronaut Wendy Lawrence has commented,
Team-building is very important. Astronauts spend countless
hours working very, very closely with the people in the Control
Center who are going to support the mission. You spend hours
getting to know them, because if you work that closely with some-
body, you get to know how they approach a problem, and you
can work together toward the goal of solving the problem."6
Indeed, according to NASA, a team functions as more than
the sum of its parts.57 Teamwork promotes excellent communi-
cation skills, tact, diplomacy, composure, and cooperation-
skills without which lawyers would be lost in space.5' As NASA
notes in its astronaut training materials, "[R]esearch points to
the development of shared mental models (i.e., the situation
where everyone in the team has a common conceptualization of
the task and the surrounding environment) as a means by which
to enhance effective teamwork.""
Just as astronauts must be able to rely on Mission Control to
solve potentially catastrophic mid-mission anomalies, a client
must be able to rely on her attorney to know how to handle
sticky situations. Each member of a representation team must
be able to trust every other member to perform his individual
task competently, even on a dime. In an educational setting, the
concepts that Mission Control was relying on to determine the
way to lead the astronauts back safely are forms of teamwork
labeled "collaborative learning or cooperative learning,"6o where
"students [interact with each other to] work on a task and learn
in small groups.""
55 Teamwork has been defined as "a crewmember's ability to develop cordial
and effective working relationships with others." Hysong et al., supra note 14, at
16.
s6 See Telephone Interview by Lisa McElroy with Wendy Lawrence, supra note
16.
57 Hysong et al., supra note 14, at 16.
58 Note that the manual also emphasizes that "good communication among
team members is critical to all of the aforementioned abilities, and is therefore
considered in conjunction with teamwork." Id.
59 Id.
-o While pedagogical, slight differences exist between the two types of learn-
ing, this article treats the two as interchangeable in examining the benefits of
collaboration in the law school setting. See, e.g., BARBARA . MILUS & PHILIP G.
COTTELL, JR., COOPERATIVE LEARNING FOR HIGHER EDUCATION FACULTY 5 (1998).
61 Roberta K. Thyfault & Kathryn Fehrman, Interactive Group Learning in the Le-
gal Writing Classroom: An International Primer on Student Collaboration and Coopera-
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We saw clearly in the Apollo 13 example that teamwork pro-
motes excellence in problem-solving. The same is true in the
law school environment, where scholars have documented the
cognitive benefits experienced in a collaborative learning envi-
ronment in the law school classroom. 2 These benefits include:
active engagement of the materials; 3 student hearing and con-
sideration of diverse opinions; higher levels of critical and re-
flective thinking;6' better retention of material;66  and the
promotion of dispute resolution and negotiation methods6'-all
of the same results noted by NASA, where collaborative learning
and performance are both expected and routine. Furthermore,
in educational experiments where psychologists have presented
a variety of types of problems to individuals and teams, the
teams have outperformed individuals on all types and across all
ages.6 8 In addition, benefits have been documented "in social
tion in Large Classrooms, 3 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 135, 139 (2009) (quoting LINDA B.
NILSON, TEACHING AT ITS BEST: A RESEARCH-BASED RESOURCE FOR COLLEGE IN-
STRUCTORS 127 (2003)) (alteration in original).
62 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Reilly, Deposing the "Tyranny of Extroverts": Collaborative
Learning in the Traditional Classroom Format, 50J. LEGAL EDUc. 593, 598-99 (2000)
(detailing a "drastic cognitive leap" resulting from "effective collaborative learn-
ing"). See generally Clifford S. Zimmerman, "Thinking Beyond My Own Interpreta-
tion:" Reflections on Collaborative and Cooperative Learning Theory in the Law School
Curriculum, 31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 957 (1999) (explaining the benefits of collaborative
and cooperative learning techniques in the law school environment). The bene-
fits of student collaboration have been studied and documented extensively. To
date, there have been more than 600 studies demonstrating that collaboration in
education "produces higher achievement, more positive relationships among stu-
dents, and psychologically healthier students." Brigette LuAnn Willauer, Com-
ment, The Law School Honor Code and Collaborative Learning: Can They Coexist? 73
UMKC L. REV. 513, 515 (2004) (quoting Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: The
Teaching and Learning Environment in Law School, 52 J. LEGAL EDUc. 75, 94 (2002)
(discussing the empirical study by G. Andrew Benjamin and co-authors of psycho-
logical distress in law students)).
63 See Reilly, supra note 62, at 599 (describing students' response to collabora-
tive learning methods).
64 See DAVID W. JOHNSON & ROGER T. JOHNSON, LEARNING TOGETHER AND
ALONE: COOPERATIVE, COMPETITIVE, AND INDIVIDUALISTIC LEARNING 53-54, 57-58
(4th ed. 1994) (stating that cooperative learning promotes interpersonal trust
and student-to-student interaction).
65 Reilly, supra note 62, at 599, 602-03.
66 Id.
67 Elizabeth L. Inglehart, Kathleen Dillon Narko & Clifford S. Zimmerman,
From Cooperative Learning to Collaborative Writing in the Legal Writing Classroom, 9 J.
LEGAL WRITING INST. 185, 188, 194, 210 (2003); Reilly, supra note 62, at 603.
68 Brigid Barron & Linda Darling-Hammond, Powerful Learning: Studies Show
Deep Understanding Derives from Collaborative Methods, EDUTOPIA (Oct. 8, 2008),
http://edutopia.org/inquiry-project-learning-research ("Results varied by how
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and behavioral areas as well, including improvement in student
self-concept, social interaction, time on task, and positive feel-
ings toward peers. Moreover, collaboration has been shown
to lessen anxiety in the law school classroom, encourage partici-
pation, reduce competitiveness, and reduce class and social bar-
riers among students.7 0 Are not all of these goals as worthy in
the training of lawyers as they are in the training of astronauts,
where self-confidence, positive feelings towards peers, and posi-
tive socialization are critical?
When considering what law professors hope to achieve in the
classroom, let's look back at the Apollo 13 scenario where Mis-
sion Control personnel worked together to come up with a crea-
tive solution to an impossible situation because the astronauts'
lives were on the line.7 1 Daily in the practice of law, lawyers are
responsible for their clients' lives and livelihood. Take a death
penalty case, or any legal issue for that matter, and consider
which of the following two attorneys you would rather have on
the case:
1. Attorney A works by herself, although in a suite shared
with other attorneys. She researches, outlines, drafts,
redrafts, and edits her brief [about a new legal issue] ab-
sent any review or input from her colleagues.
2. Attorney B also works in a suite of offices, but she often
talks with her colleagues about legal issues. She raises
each new issue with them during the course of her think-
ing, research, outlining, drafting, and redrafting. She in-
corporates the input received, which confirms some
points and leads her to rethink others. Eventually, she is
comfortable with the arguments, presentation, and writ-
well defined the problems were (a single right answer versus open-ended solu-
tions, such as writing a story) and how much they relied on language. Several
experimental studies have shown that groups outperform individuals on learning
tasks and that individuals who work in groups do better on later individual
assessments.").
69 Id. "Researchers say these social and self-concept measures were related to
academic outcomes and that low-income students, urban students, and minority
students benefited even more from cooperative group work, a finding repeated
over several decades." Id.
70 See generally Susan Bryant, Collaboration in Law Practice: A Satisfying and Produc-
tive Process for a Diverse Profession, 17 VT. L. REv. 459 (1993) (detailing the benefits
of collaborative methods in both legal practice and the law school environment).
See also JOHNSON & JOHNSON, supra note 64, at 53-54 (explaining that collabora-
tive methods of instruction promote interpersonal trust, effective coping strate-
gies, and greater psychological health).
71 Lovell, supra note 50, at 12-51.
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ing style, and asks a colleague to read the draft and pro-
vide feedback on organization, clarity, and persuasiveness.
As a result of the critique, Attorney B rethinks her argu-
ments, presentation, and style, then edits and files her
brief with the court.
The difference in working styles between Attorneys A and B
will likely be "outcome determinative."7 3 Attorney A used an in-
dividual and autonomous style that is consistent with the tradi-
tional law school classroom.74 Attorney B used a team approach
that fostered creativity and promoted the best possible result for
her client.75 It is well-established that the practice of law is a
social enterprise-why then would we not educate our students
using techniques that produce high levels of cognitive and social
results individually and will produce the best outcome for future
clients?
While NASA has a history of focusing on teamwork to accom-
plish tasks successfully, the law school classroom has historically
focused on competition, individualism, and autonomy.76 Unlike
at Mission Control, where a social environment of collaboration
existed, creating "a community to organize sustained project
work"77 in law schools may be challenging. Toward that end,
"[1]aw teachers must exercise some introspection and question
the roles they serve and what they hope their students will
achieve."7
And, of course, the practical lesson to take away: when we're
under time pressure, when we're trying to find just the right
72 Zimmerman, supra note 62, at 961-62 (citation omitted).
73 Id. at 963.
74 Id. at 962; see also Carole Silver, Adventures in Comparative Legal Studies: Study-
ingSingapore, 51 J. LEGAL EDUc. 75, 85-86 (2001) (noting that "[l]aw school still is
very much an individual experience").
75 Zimmerman, supra note 62, at 962-63; see also Dorothy H. Evenson, To Group
or Not to Group: Students' Perceptions of Collaborative Learning Activities in Law School,
28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 343, 377 (2004) (describing collaborative environment of
clinical program).
76 See Willauer, supra note 62, at 518 (citing David W. Smit, Some Difficulties with
Collaborative Learning, 9 JAC 45 (1989), available at http://www.jacweb.org/
Archivedvolumes/Text articles/V9_Smit.htm); Zimmerman, supra note 62, at
97.
77 Barron & Darling-Hammond, supra note 68. According to leading research-
ers in this area, there are five important elements for a successful collaborative
experience: positive interdependence, individual accountability, structures that
promote face-to-face interaction, social skills, and group processing. NILSON,
supra note 61, at 127-32.
78 Zimmerman, supra note 62, at 986.
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analogy, when we're shouldered with the responsibility of saving
a client's life and livelihood, it never hurts to "get the coffee
goin.' "7
IV. ATTITUDE: HOPE AND OPTIMISM
"Mystery creates wonder and wonder is the basis for man's desire to
understand. 'o
Let us return one last time to the story of Apollo 13, in which,
on Day 2 of the mission, the electrical system and both oxygen
tanks failed, putting the astronauts at a very real risk of per-
ishing in space." They were relying entirely on the engineers in
Houston, who shared a common goal: they were not going to
lose their astronauts. No, for the folks at Mission Control, "fail-
ure [was] not an option."8 2
Ever since President John F. Kennedy called upon NASA to
reach the moon, the space program has been based on hope
and optimism." Reaching the moon, like making it through law
school or representing clients, was never considered to be a sim-
ple task; indeed, President Kennedy told the world that the
United States would go to the moon "not because [it was] easy,
but because [it was] hard."84 And yet many law students, even
those who understand and embrace how rigorous the law school
task will be, report that law school is based not on hope and
optimism, not on teamwork, but on negativity and competition,
especially in the first year. 5
79 See supra notes 47-49.
80 Transcript of Astronauts' Addresses to Congress, supra note 53 (quoting Neil A.
Armstrong).
81 Lovell, supra note 50, at 12-42.
82 The quote, "Failure is not an option," has been attributed to Gene Kranz,
Flight Director of the Apollo 13 mission, but it was actually written for his charac-
ter in the 1999 film. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF MODERN QUOTATIONS (Elizabeth
Knowles ed., 2008).
83 President John F. Kennedy, Rice Stadium Moon Speech (Sept. 12, 1962)
(transcript available at http://er.jsc.nasa.gov/seh/ricetalk.htm); see also Rebecca
Sprague, Moon Likely a Hub for Mars, Beyond, NASA (Oct. 1, 2008), http://
www.nasa.gov/centers/kennedy/about/history/50th-apollo.html (quoting Presi-
dent Kennedy).
84 Kennedy, supra note 83.
85 See, e.g., Allison Martin & Kevin Rand, The Future's So Bright, I Gotta Wear
Shades: Law School Through the Lens of Hope, 48 DuQ. L. REv. 203, 204 (explaining
why "[IJaw students need hope"); Making Docile Lawyers: An Essay on the Pacifica-
tion of Law Students, 111 HARv. L. REv. 2027, 2034-35 (1998) (documenting ob-
servations of Harvard Law School students); Kennon M. Sheldon & Lawrence S.
Krieger, Note, Does Legal Education Have Undermining Effects on Law Students? Eval-
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How can we better strive to create a law school culture in
which enthusiasm for learning and excitement about the mis-
sion last beyond the first days of law school? Scholars have dis-
cussed this issue with concern for decades86 but recognize that
law schools are resistant to change. Yet some also recognize
that the task, while not easy, is worthwhile and suggest concrete
steps toward improving attitude and approaching law school
and law practice with positivity.8" For example, according to
Emily Zimmerman, professors can seek to make law-study per-
sonally meaningful for students by connecting what they are
learning to their "experiences and interests outside of law
school.""
Perhaps by harnessing the mystery and wonder with which stu-
dents enter law school, we can help them navigate their studies
more successfully and positively. To do so, however, we will have
to make the end goal more worthwhile than earning high
grades or a spot on a prestigious journal. 0 We will have to find
ways to help students buy into the mission, to help them see that
failure is not an option when representing clients, to help them
understand that they have the tools and the smarts to make the
connections they need to make to accomplish great things. Per-
haps we can even do so by telling them the story of Apollo 13, by
encouraging them to find a way to fit the round "filter" into the
square "scrubber."91 Here's what they will learn: you've only got
what you've got, tube socks, flight plans, and all. As attorneys,
we would love to have a case perfectly on point, one that says
without ambiguity that our client wins. Such a case is rare, how-
ever, and we're more often in the position of having to convince
uating Changes in Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, 22 BEHAv. Sci. & L. 261,
262-63 (2004) (detailing results of research showing increased emotional distress
among law students).
86 Emily Zimmerman has developed a paradigm through which we might dis-
cuss and measure law student enthusiasm. See generally Emily Zimmerman, An
Interdisciplinary Framework for Understanding and Cultivating Law Student Enthusiasm,
58 DEPAUL L. REv. 851 (2009); see also Martin & Rand, supra note 85, at 209
(explaining the psychology and characteristics of hope and optimism and
describing an empirical study supporting the notion that hope leads to greater
success in the first semester of law school).
87 See generally STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 11; SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 10.
88 See, e.g., STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 11, at 170 (advocating positive reinforce-
ment, acknowledgement of new ideas, and praise for worthwhile statements).
89 Zimmerman, supra note 62, at 909.
90 See id. at 917 ("One way to make law schools better environments for law
students is by helping students develop enthusiasm for law study.").
91 See Dumoulin, supra note 2.
[ 75520
FAILURE IS NOT AN OPTION
the court, using available authority as well as a heavy dose of
persuasion in the form of analogy and distinction, that our cli-
ent can and should win. We have to make this [a somewhat
helpful case] fit into this [our client's facts] usin' nothin' but
that [all of our analytical and persuasive writing skills]."
V. CONCLUSION
"[L]ooking back, we were really very privileged to live in that thin slice
of history where we changed how man looks at himself and what he
might become and where he might go."
On July 20, 1969, when we were very small children, our
mothers propped us up in front of the television set to watch
Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin walk on the moon. At the time,
the idea that we could send a tin can many thousands of miles
into space to land on what many believed to be green cheese
seemed to be an impossible one. For the next several years, we
would regularly launch men into the stratosphere to learn what
lay beyond. Why? Perhaps it was to beat the Russians in a race
that seemed, at the time, to be an indicator of which world
power would prevail.94 Perhaps it was for adventure: because
the moon was there." And perhaps, as President Kennedy pos-
ited, it was to discover new landscapes, to test our mettle in
achieving a truly difficult feat.9"
But what we achieved through Apollo 13 was perhaps even
more profound. In the words of Fred Haise, the mission's lunar
module pilot,
[Apollo 13] offers a graphic example and a very dramatic exam-
ple ... [ofi what can happen if you do have . .. the right people,
the right skill mix, that are trained and they're assembled in this
team and they work together under the right leadership. You
know, what a miracle can happen. And that's what was the case
of Apollo 13.
92 See APoLLo 13, supra note 47.
93 Armstrong, supra note 13, at 92.
94 See Steven J. Dick, The Voyages of Apollo, NASA (May 30, 2006), http://
www.nasa.gov/exploration/whyweexplore/WhyWe-20.html (addressing the
space rivalry between Russia and the United States).
95 See Larry Gormley, 'Because It's There, http://ehistory.osu.edu/world/arti-
cles/articleview.cfm?AID=11 (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) (referring to Mount Ever-
est explorer George Mallory's rationale in 1924 for why he wanted to climb
Mount Everest-"Because it's there.").
96 Kennedy, supra note 83.
97 Haise, supra note 15, at 12-41.
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As law professors, we are really very privileged to work with
law students in this thin slice of time, these three or four years,
when they are learning the skills they need to represent clients.
If we do it well, we may help them reach the moon; if we fall
back on tradition, they may never even launch.
